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PARTY POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Description

A discussion of the major Dutch political parties, including analyses of each group's pre-1940 platform and strength, the role of party politics in the Netherlands Government-in-exile, the status of parties in the occupied homeland, and the problems of restoration. A special section on the Dutch National Socialist Movement is appended.

16 August 1944

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Summary

1. The Dutch political scene before the invasion was characterized by the existence of many political parties, no one of which ever had a majority in Parliament. Consequently, the Netherlands was governed from the time of the first world war by coalition ministries.

2. A comparatively stable government existed in spite of the many political parties. These parties differed more about religious issues than about social and political problems.

3. The influence of the communist and fascist parties in the Netherlands was very small. Neither party ever controlled more than 6 percent of the votes.

4. The 1940 ministry was a coalition cabinet of the Catholic and Socialist parties, to which had been added some members of the Protestant parties. When the Netherlands capitulated, the ministry and the royal family left for England, where they formed the Government-in-exile. No members of Parliament were evacuated, however, with the result that the cabinet has been without any legislative base.

5. After the invasion several of the political parties still tried to play a role through the formation of a coalition party called the Netherlands Union. Gradually, however, all old political movements were outlawed and dissolved. The Nationalist Socialist Movement was the only party allowed to continue its activities.

6 It is difficult to determine accurately the political developments in the Occupied Netherlands. There are many indications, however, that at least a substantial part of the population wants a realignment of parties on the basis of social and economic questions instead of religious issues.

PARTY POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS

I. INTRODUCTION

From 1848 until 1940 the government of the Netherlands was a constitutional monarchy, based upon popular representation. The expulsion of the German occupation forces will presumably be followed by the restoration of the same governmental structure. It is not the purpose of this guide to analyze the entire constitutional framework of Dutch government, but only to describe one aspect: political parties, their pre-war strengths and platforms, their situation at present, and some problems with respect to their future revival.

In 1933 no fewer than fifty-four parties offered candidates in the national elections, and fourteen actually gained representation in the Second Chamber, Holland's "House of Representatives." Under the multi-party system, no one party ever had a legislative majority, a circumstance which of necessity resulted in coalition government. Every cabinet had to include representatives of parties which in combination could muster a majority. "Coalition government" sometimes carries with it a connotation of instability, yet Dutch ministries were, in fact, relatively stable.

A. Historic Division.

Prior to 1848 the Netherlands had no political parties as such, but there had been a three-fold division of Dutchmen

into Conservatives, Liberals, and "Anti-Revolutionaries." The first of these groups favored absolute monarchy and had the support of the King and the aristocracy. After 1848, however, limited monarchy was an accomplished fact; by 1887 the Conservatives had disappeared from the scene.

The Liberals represented the opposition to authoritarianism. Their viewpoint found its clearest expression in the tenets of the French Revolution; and it was to this Revolution that Dutch Liberals turned for their doctrinal guidance. Above all, they argued against the division of political groups on the basis of religious beliefs.

The third movement, that of the "Anti-Revolutionaries," was Calvinist in composition and ideology. It rejected what it considered the anarchistic line of Liberals and insisted that human freedom must conform to the sovereignty of God.

The closing years of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of political parties in the modern sense of the term, as the old groups adopted definite form and discipline. In 1878, the Calvinist elements described in the preceding paragraph organized the Anti-Revolutionary Party and their opponents formed the Liberal Union in 1884. The Catholics were slower to organize--not until 1896 did the Roman Catholic State Party begin to function. Then in 1897 a new party, the Social-Democratic League, a trade union movement organized by Socialists with international affiliations for the first time placed a representative

in the Second Chamber. These four parties still provided a basis for grouping the many parties of the 1930's. Other factors were present in the situation, however, factors at once promoting the fragmentation into small factions and making possible the survival of coalition ministries.

B. The Role of Religion

Throughout the modern history of the Netherlands, the religious issue has been one of such importance that the majority of Dutch political parties actually were founded on points of theology. Long after the Spanish grip on the Low Countries had been relaxed, the memory of Spain's Catholic theocracy aroused hostility to the Church of Rome on the part of many Netherlanders. So too did the devastation left by Louis XIV's armies in the late seventeenth century. Consequently, the Calvinist majority in the northern Netherlands was slow to accept the right of Catholics to freedom of worship. Not until 1795 were Catholic services legal in the country, and certain discriminatory restrictions upon Catholic meetings or demonstrations persisted until the end of the Napoleonic era. This religious animosity, though decreasingly acute during the past century, still survives as a major factor in Dutch politics.

As a consequence of their resistance to Calvinist domination, practically all Dutch Catholics have banded together to form the Roman Catholic State Party, Holland's

largest single political group. To achieve this solidarity the Catholics have submerged differences of opinion on public issues so sharp as to approach the point of contradiction. The dominance of the religious consideration has thus created a paradox in terms of social and economic alignments. In all but religion, a conservative member of the Roman Catholic State Party is in far closer agreement with a Protestant conservative than with a fellow Catholic of liberal views.

While the Catholics banded together in politics, the Calvinist majority tended to split into a number of smaller parties. Religious disputes within Dutch Protestantism, which were seriously regarded by the Dutch, resulted in the secession of small denominational groups and the establishment of independent political parties based on these groups. The question of religious education was the issue which brought the Protestant and Catholic factions gradually into close alliance. Their opponents held that state funds should be used only for non-sectarian education, but the coalition of religious parties was strong enough to win its point; and under the constitution of 1917 the State undertook to subsidize private schools sponsored by the various church groups. That victory should not, however, create a false impression of complete and continuing understanding between Catholic and Calvinist parties. In 1925, for example, a temporary rift occurred when the Protestants succeeded in cutting off funds for Dutch diplomatic representation at the Vatican; and in 1939 the differences between

the religious parties became so acute that their coalition was dissolved with the Protestants going into opposition.

C. Native Conservatism

The Netherlands before 1940 had relatively little extreme poverty. The economic status of the Dutch was one which tended to soften the sharpness of conflict often present in political and economic debate. The voters of the Netherlands have not been averse to change but neither have they been attracted by radicalism. The comparatively mild atmosphere of Dutch politics goes far toward explaining the stability of the government.

D. Constitutional Factors

Certain technical features of the Dutch system also helped to give stability to coalition cabinets. For example, the rule of proportional representation discouraged independent voting by party representatives. The citizen cast his ballot for the party list of his choice; and the one hundred seats of the Second Chamber were apportioned to the parties in accordance with the percentage of the total vote received by each. Under such an arrangement the individual legislator was the prisoner of his party, and tended to "stay in line."

Another reason for the small number of cabinets overturned (seven between 1917 and 1940) lay in the principle of individual ministerial responsibility. In the Dutch cabinet each minister was personally responsible for his acts, and except where the issue was so broad that the government as

a whole was under attack, censure or defeat of a minister by the Second Chamber involved only that minister and did not necessitate the resignation of the whole cabinet. This individual ministerial responsibility was consistent with the position of the head of the Dutch cabinet. The latter's vote counted for no more than that of any of his colleagues. Though appointed by the crown, he was not a prime minister, but a Minister-President, who was only primus inter pares.

II. PRE-INVASION PARTIES

Chart I provides the name, strength, and, where discernible, the geographical distribution of each of the ten parties represented in the Second Chamber after 1937. The chart further provides brief notes on the principal planks in each party's platform during the late 1930's. Certain general observations concerning the pre-invasion parties will lend direction to the examination of these data.

A. Party Groups

Dutch political thought was for the most part divided into four major groupings, represented by 1) the Roman Catholics, 2) the Protestants, (Anti-Revolutionary Party, Christian Historical Union, Christian Democratic Union, and Christian Reformed Party), 3) the Socialists, and 4) the Liberals (Liberal Democratic Party and Liberal State Party). In the denominational parties, however, there were economic sub-groups: labor, the trading middle

Chart I. NAMES, STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND PLATFORMS OF DUTCH PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE SECOND CHAMBER IN 1940

PARTY NAME	NUMBER OF SEATS WON IN SECOND CHAMBER (1937)	IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF PARTY'S SUPPORT	GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF STRENGTH	FEATURES OF PARTY'S PLATFORM DURING 1930'S
Roman Catholic State Party (Roomsche Katholieke Staatspartij)	31	Catholic laymen, of all shades of political viewpoint and economic interests.	Strongest in southern provinces, and in large cities all over Netherlands.	Favored protective tariff, planned economy, corporative society, more liberal social legislation, equality in status of public and denominational private schools.
Social Democratic Labor Party (Social-Democratische Arbeiders Partij)	23	Industrial and white-collar workers.	Strongest in industrial centers.	Favored more liberal labor legislation, nationalization of utilities and some other industries, public works, liberal state pensions, increased independence for the colonial territories. Opposed nationalism, armaments.
Anti-Revolutionary Party (Anti-Revolutionnaire Partij)	17	Protestant farmers and lower middle class.	Widespread, weak only in Limburg.	Favored frugality in government, laissez-faire, increased regional and local autonomy, equality in status of public and private schools, governmental enforcement of morality, strong armaments, pro-native colonial policy.
ristian Historical Union hristelijk-Historische Unie)	8	Protestants, including some of "first families."	Strongest in Zeeland, Friesland, Gelderland.	Similar to Anti-Revolutionary platform, except for more extensive labor legislation program in case of the Christian Historical Union.
iberal Democratic Party (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond)	6	Non-Catholic middle class.	Widespread except for southern provinces of Limburg and North Brabant.	Favored legislative support for labor, state pensions, graduated income taxes, increased governmental intervention in economic life, co-operation with League of Nations. Opposed support for private schools, armaments.
National Socialist Party (National-Socialistische Beweging)	4	Germanophiles and some dissident unemployed.	No distinguishable grouping.	Favored dictatorship on German model, corporative society, anti-Semitic measures, pro-German foreign policy.
Liberal State Party (Liberal Staatspartij)	4	Middle class elements, representative fusion of former members of old Liberal Party.	Widespread except for Catholic strongholds in Southeast.	Favored broad suffrage, laissez-faire, strong armaments, co-operation with League of Nations. Opposed theological arguments in political life, socialization of industry.
Communist Party (Communist Partij)	3	Workers and intellectuals who after 1906 found Social Democrats too conservative.	Strongest in industrial centers.	Favored application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, but presented demands tempered in deference to conservatism of Dutch voters. Opposed, until late 1939, any co-operation with Germany. Pro-Russian.

Chart I (continued).

PARTY NAME	NUMBER OF SEATS WON IN SECOND CHAMBER (1937)	IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF PARTY'S SUPPORT	GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF STRENGTH	FEATURES OF PARTY'S PLATFORM DURING 1930'S
Christian Democratic Union (Christelijk Democratische Unie)	2	Protestant farmers and workers.	Greatest strength among farmers in Friesland and Groningen.	Favored partial socialization of industries (utilities, railroads, and some other key public services), better working conditions, subsidies to farmers, free trade, disarmamen .
Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij)	2	Protestant upper middle class.	Evenly but thinly distributed.	Favored laissez-faire, abolition of woman suffrage, passage of "blue laws."

class, the white-collar middle class, the wealthy farmers, and the big employers. Thus each of these denominational parties united within its organization conflicting interests of the various social and economic groups.

The only parties represented in the Parliament of 1940 which did not fall within one or another of the four major divisions were the National Socialists (Nazis) and the Communists. The inability of these extreme groups to attract any extensive popular support is reflected in their weakness in the 1937 election (Chart I). The conservatism of the average Dutch voter, combined with the economic conditions which made for the absence of a discontented proletariat, made it impossible for Communism to win a broad backing from the electorate. Even in the depression years of the early thirties, when the Communist Party attained its greatest strength, it had only four seats in the Second Chamber, and in 1937 it lost one of these. Made up of a combination of dissatisfied leftist elements, including portions of the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party found it difficult also to achieve internal unity. On the eve of the invasion, the party still was rent by sharp disagreements regarding aims and methods.

The Dutch National Socialist Movement (National Socialistische Beweging der Nederlanden or NSB) was founded in 1931 by Anton Mussert. It patterned its platform after that of its German model, advocating dictatorship, a

corporative state, and anti-Semitism. In 1936 it received 6 percent of the votes in provincial and municipal elections to achieve its top pre-war strength But Nazi extremism attracted the Dutch voter almost as little as did Communist; and the NSB lost votes as German aggressiveness became more apparent. In 1937, the party showed only two-thirds of its previous year's strength; and in the ensuing three years it declined even further.

The special role of the NSB under German occupation is discussed under Section V.

B. Party Strengths

The solidarity of the Dutch Catholic vote gave to the Roman Catholic State Party the largest single bloc of seats in the Second Chamber (31 %). The Protestant denominational parties together could boast almost as large a number of seats (Anti-Revolutionaries, 17; "Christian Historians," 8; Christian Democrats, 2; and Reformed, 2). Larger than any Protestant party, and second only to the Catholics, was the Socialist Social Democratic Labor Party (23) which did not make religious denomination a criterion for membership.

C. Geographical Distribution

Geographical distribution of party strength was less important in Holland than in larger nations. Catholic votes centered in the southern provinces and elsewhere in large cities. Conversely, the Protestant groups tended to be stronger in the north; but this division was neither

clear-cut nor significant. The Social Democrats, relying as they did largely on the labor vote, drew their main support from the large cities.

D. Divisions on Major Issues

With only a few exceptions, Dutch political parties were built around religious issues, and in many cases retained their cohesion in spite of seemingly irreconcilable internal differences over social and economic questions. This basic condition of politics in the Netherlands explains a situation in which economic interests cut squarely across the lines of denominational parties. The Social Democrats constituted one important exception to that rule; the Communists another. But there were strong exponents of some form of socialism in the other major parties as well.

Chart II illustrates the difficulty of delineating "Right" and "Left" in terms of parties in the Netherlands. As mentioned earlier, the Roman Catholic State Party included elements of all except the most extreme shades of political coloration. Dutch Catholics may have differed on specific matters of legislation, but they were united in maintaining their position against the Calvinist parties. Within each of the Protestant parties too, there were points of difference so acute that only sectarian loyalty could reconcile them. As shown in Chart II, it is impossible to distinguish between the two largest Calvinist groups in terms of "Right" and "Left." The founders of the Christian Historical Union



Chart II. "RIGHT" AND "LEFT" IN THE SECOND CHAMBER, 1940
(With number of seats indicated for each party)

had broken away from the Anti-Revolutionary Party because they believed that the latter had "strayed to the left" of its original position. The Christian Historians took their stand on "the authority of the Bible," but actually deviated little from the position of the mother party. In fact, during the late 1930's it advocated labor and social legislation more strongly than did the Anti-Revolutionaries.

No single issue has been more hotly contested in modern Dutch politics than that which centered about the question of donominational education. The religious parties with Catholics and Calvinists in alliance were victorious in 1917, but some opposition to the principle of state support of parochial schools which was established in that year, continued to be voiced by the Liberals and the Social Democrats.

The dispute over the gold standard and devaluation of the currency provided an example of the manner in which economic alignments cut across party lines. Under the Colijn ministry, the Netherlands in 1935 abandoned the gold standard. In the debates which preceded the government's decision, every one of the major parties was internally divided. The Catholics, the Social Democrats, the Anti- Revolutionaries, the Christian Historians, all split into "cheap money" and "dear money" factions.

The proponents of various types of planned economy, to turn to still another issue, centered in the Catholic,

Social Democratic, Liberal Democratic, Communist, and National Socialist Parties. The laissez-faire front which opposed these parties included Anti-Revolutionaries, Liberal State Party members and Christian Democrats. The Christian Historical Union was less attached to laissez-faire than might be expected from its traditions, a large and articulate faction within it demanding regulatory legislation to aid workers. Here again the religious parties split on political questions. There were Catholic exponents of "free trade" to oppose the stand adopted by their party; and an important section of the Christian Democratic Union was ready to accept increased governmental intervention. In spite of some small victories by the proponents of government regulation, the Netherlands of the 1930's remained a stronghold of laissez-faire economy.

The international problems of Europe in the 1930's were not important party issues in the Netherlands. There was, of course, popular discussion of armaments, alliances, and the League of Nations. But the parties did not stand or fall by their official attitudes toward those questions and some did not even attempt to formulate official attitudes. All debate on foreign affairs was secondary to an almost complete unanimity in favor of neutrality. Chart I shows which groups enunciated views on international issues, but those views were in every case secondary in importance to the religious and social planks. Except for the school question,

the gold standard, and the broad principle of controlled economy, the important issues in the pre-war Dutch scene fell outside the scope of most parties' platforms.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS PRECEDING THE INVASION[1]

A. Coalition Ministries

Ruijs de Beerenbrouck, leader of the Catholic Party, and H. Colijn, leader of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, dominated the coalition governments of the Netherlands in the period between the two wars. The necessity of maintaining educational gains against the opposition of the non-religious parties kept the coalition of the Catholic and Protestant parties largely intact until the 30's. In 1929 a temporary rupture in relations occurred, however, over the question of diplomatic representation to the Vatican (see above, p.4.) This incident caused the overthrow of Colijn and the establishment of a government under M. D. J. de Geer, leader of the Christian Historical Union, a government which lasted three years.

In 1929 de Geer's cabinet fell because of the rejection of the proposed Belgian treaty by Parliament

1. See Chart III for a list of Ministries, 1917-1939.

Chart III. DUTCH MINISTRIES, 1918-1944

1918-1922	Ruys de Beerenbrouck	(First Ministry)
1922-1925	Ruys de Beerenbrouck	(Second Ministry)
1925-1926	H. Colijn	(First Ministry)
1926-1929	M. D. J. de Geer	(First Ministry)
1929-1933	Ruys de Beerenbrouck	(Third Ministry)
1933-1935	H. Colijn	(Second Ministry)
1935-1939	H. Colijn	(Third Ministry)
1939 (one day)	H. Colijn	(Fourth Ministry)
1939-1940 (September)	M. D. J. de Geer	(Second Ministry)
1940-	P. S. Gerbrandy	

and a new ministry was formed by the Catholic leader, Beerenbrouck. During the depression period of the middle thirties the Colijn ministry, restored in 1933, broadened the basis of the coalition government by including in the cabinet representatives from the Liberal State Party and Liberal Democratic Party.

As noted in the previous section, the Catholic Party began in the 1930's to lean toward a protective tariff, more liberal social legislation, improved labor conditions, planned economy, state interference in economic life, and the establishment of a corporative structure of society. Thus the Catholics tended to draw away from the more conservative Protestant parties. In the 1937 election Colijn personally was endorsed by the electorate, but the opposition of left-wing Catholics to Colijn's conservativism grew in intensity. This opposition, combined with tension created by the international situation, caused the overthrow of the Colijn government on 30 June 1939.

Colijn formed another ministry, composed almost entirely of non-partisans and "technicians." The Catholics had no representation in the new ministry, and their opposition, together with that of the Socialists, caused Colijn's overthrow on the first day his cabinet appeared before the Dutch House of Representatives. In spite of their victory, however, disagreements between the Catholics and Socialists defeated their efforts to form an alternative ministry.

B. The de Geer Ministry

The Queen called for a complete ministerial reorganization and instructed de Geer, who had served as Minister-President in the late twenties, to establish a ministry on a broader political basis. De Geer succeeded in forming a group composed of representatives of four leading parties: Catholic, Social Democratic Labor, Christian Historical, and Liberal Democratic. The Anti-Revolutionary and Liberal State Parties refused to join the new coalition, but even without them de Geer enjoyed the strongest majority to back any government in the past half century. This ministry, formed on 9 August 1939, was in power at the time of the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

A. Conditioning Factors

Germany's invasion of the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 brought within a few hours the realization that the Dutch government would have to be evacuated promptly or fall under the control of the invader. The Queen, the royal family, and the cabinet ministers were flown to London, which in the ensuing years was to serve as the seat for the Dutch Government-in-exile. The operation of party politics in London was from the first conditioned by several circumstances growing out of the plight of a government hastily and incompletely transferred to a foreign capital and severed from the occupied land it had governed.

1. Separation from Parliament. The de Geer ministry had been based upon a broad coalition; under the Dutch system, the composition of the cabinet was inseparable from the composition of the Second Chamber. In the flight to London, however, no members of the legislature were included; even the presidents of the two chambers were left in the Netherlands. The subsequent emigration of a few MP's notwithstanding, the Dutch Cabinet in London was actually divorced from its legislative base. The advisory council which was set up in London in late 1940 was composed of seventeen members all appointed by the Crown, and was based on territorial representation. This council had no truly legislative functions.

2. Increased Influence of the Queen and the Minister-President. The exigencies of war have led to an increase in the influence of the Queen and a concentration of governmental power in the hands of the Minister-President, who assumed the responsibility for directing all ministerial activities. Under de Geer, and under P. S. Gerbrandy, who succeeded him in September 1940,[1] the position of Minister-President evolved until it came to resemble that of the British prime minister.

3. Limited Choice of Personnel. A third factor conditioning the operations of the Dutch Government in London has been the limited number of political leaders available for ministerial assignments. Selection of cabinet members on the basis of their party affiliations has been impossible. The dominant qualifications for each new appointee are his presence in London and his potential contribution to the war effort.

B. Results

1. Representation. By August 1944 the Catholic State Party, holder of 31 percent of the seats in the 1940 Second Chamber, had not one representative in the Dutch cabinet

1. De Geer, when relieved of his post, embarked for the East Indies to assume another position. While en route he suddenly turned about and returned to the occupied Netherlands, an act for which the Dutch Government denounced him as a traitor. Shortly after his return to Holland, he published a pamphlet entitled "The Synthesis of War," in which he set forth views not incompatible with collaboration. De Geer is no longer considered by either Dutch or Germans as an important political force.

(see Chart IV). Frequent changes during the four years in London had not served to strengthen the representative character of the Ministry; in the case of many members of the cabinet, party affiliation was either secondary or actually meaningless. Underground sources have reported a feeling in Holland that the Government-in-exile has lost touch with the people of the homeland.

2. Popularity of the Queen. There is considerable evidence that the popularity of the Queen has continued. Even the Socialist underground paper, Het Parool, while rejecting the principle of hereditary monarchy, paid tribute to Queen Wilhelmina. Het Parool insisted, however, that this popular devotion was, and should be, reserved for the person of the Queen, not for monarchy as such. The paper advised the Dutch people not to be carried away by their devotion and enthusiasm to the point of granting unlimited power to the monarch. Dutch opinion regarding the Princess, Prince Consert, and other members of the royal family apparently tends to be somewhat less enthusiastic.

3. Opposition in London and in the Netherlands. The original expression of Government-in-exile was non-partisan and centered about two criticisms. One of these pointed to Dutch unpreparedness for the German assault; but feeling on this subject declined in intensity during 1940, as it became apparent that the Netherlands had not been the only western

Chart IV. THE DUTCH MINISTRY-IN-EXILE (1 August 1944)

Department	14 May 1940 Minister	Party	1 August 1944 Minister	Party
General Affairs	de Geer (Minister-Pres.)	Nonpartisan	van Boeyen	Christian Historical Union
Finance	"	"	van den Broek	Nonpartisan
Colonies	Welter	Catholic	van Mook	Nonpartisan
Economic Affairs[1]	Steenberghe	Catholic		
Public Works	Albarda	Social Democratic Labor	Albarda	Social Democratic Labor
Social Affairs	van den Tempel	Social Democratic Labor	van den Tempel	Social Democratic Labor
General Affairs	van Boeyen	Christian Historical Union	van Boeyen	Christian Historical Union
Interior	"	"	Burger	Social Democratic Labor
Education	Bolkestein	Liberal Democrat	Bolkestein	Liberal Democrat
Justice	Gerbrandy	Nonpartisan	G.J. van Heuven Goedhart	Nonpartisan
Foreign Affairs	Kleffens	Nonpartisan	Kleffens	Nonpartisan
Defense[1]	Dyxhoorn	Nonpartisan		
War[2]			van Lidth de Jeude	Liberal State
Marine[2]			Furstner	Nonpartisan
Coordination of War[2]			Gerbrandy (Minister-Pres.)	Nonpartisan
Industry and Commerce[2]			van den Broek (acting)	Nonpartisan
Shipping and Fisheries[2]			de Booy	Nonpartisan
Without Portfolio[2]			van Verduynen	Nonpartisan

1. This ministry did not exist in the cabinet of 7 June 1944.
2. This ministry did not exist in the cabinet of 14 May 1940.

European nation to find itself unready to repel the Nazis. The second criticism was directed at both the royal family and the cabinet for leaving the nation to face German occupation without constitutional leadership and for not having evacuated any portion of the Parliament. On this second point, as on the first, popular feeling lessened when the activities of the Government-in-exile proved that the exodus to England had made it possible for Holland to continue as a belligerent, instead of acquiescing as a captive.

The opposition which had been excited by the military events of 1940 had no sooner subsided, however, than new opposition from specific parties began to arise, leveled at the composition and activities of the government in London. The Catholics, strongest member of the 1939 coalition, expressed concern over their loss of representation in the cabinet. The Socialists, second strongest component of de Geer's war ministry opposed what seemed to them to be an increasingly authoritarian line adopted by the government. From the standpoint of party politics this Catholic and Socialist opposition is more significant than that expressed by certain industrial and commercial groups which have felt that their private interests were suffering as a result of decisions made by the Government-in-exile.

C. Effect on Political Parties

Dutch observers appear to be in general agreement that party groupings have had little part in determining

the composition and politics of the Government-in-exile. Almost all Catholic leaders, for example, remained in Holland and thus have been unavailable to represent their party in London. At the same time, it is probable that the emergency circumstances of the London government have done little to alter or destroy the fundamental nature and distinctions of Dutch politics. The more significant changes in the structure and activities of parties have naturally taken place in the occupied Netherlands themselves, for it is there that the people, the basis of the parties, have been experiencing the rigors of Nazi rule.

V. POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED NETHERLANDS

A. Occupational Alignments

Except for the Communist Party, which was legally dissolved and went underground on the day of invasion, Dutch parties were permitted by the German authorities to continue their existence until August 1941. This existence was subject, of course, to ever-increasing restrictions; and the function of political groups was nullified by the dissolution of representative assemblies and the prohibition of all elections. Nevertheless, the temporary acceptance of the new situation on the part of the established parties has significance for the future of Dutch politics. The failure of party leaders to seize the initiative in organizing resistance resulted in its being undertaken primarily by groups which recognized no attachment to any party.

The first party to be affected by German intervention was the Social Democratic Labor Party, which in July 1940 was placed under supervision of a Dutch Nazi, Rost van Tonningen. The Social Democrats, like the Communists and the Revolutionary Socialists, had before the invasion taken the precaution of transferring their party funds to Great Britain.

The political leaders who remained in the homeland apparently felt that some type of political unity would be necessary. In June 1940 representatives of the leading political parties met and adopted a platform which had been written by Dr. H. Colijn, former Minister-President and leader of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. This platform, while conceding the necessity of cooperating with the occupation authorities in the daily routine of affairs, proclaimed that the Dutch would never accept as a final settlement anything less than independence under the leadership of the House of Orange. The manifesto was endorsed by representatives of the following parties: Roman Catholic, Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, Social Democratic, Liberal State, and Liberal Democratic. However, the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, refused to accede to the formation of a political movement founded on these principles and forbade the group to hold meetings.

B. Netherlands Union

Three leaders[1] of the first, unsuccessful unity movement

1. J. Linthorst Homan (Queen's Commissioner for the province of Groningen).
J. E. de Quay (Professor of Economics at the Commercial College of Tilburg).
L. Einthoven (former Chief of Police of Rotterdam).

subsequently adopted a more conciliatory line. Their efforts resulted in the formation of the Netherlands Union, which issued its initial manifesto on 24 July 1940. Attempting to create a united political front by accepting at least one plank from each party platform, the Netherlands Union's program sought also to reconcile some measure of collaboration with a simultaneous expression of attachment to the old order. On the issues which had led to German suppression of the first union, specifically those of independence and loyalty to the House of Orange, the Netherlands Union took a vague and equivocal position.

Although it was endorsed by the Social Democratic Party, now dominated by Tonningen, and by some elements in the other parties, the Netherlands Union was promptly denounced by the Anti-Revolutionaries and the Liberal parties. The Catholic press too issued several critical editorials. Nevertheless, the Union made rapid gains and in less than a year after its formation claimed over 800,000 adherents. The explanation for its original growth is probably to be found in the fact that the Dutch were eager to rally about any fellow Dutchmen who offered some alternative to a population unorganized and voiceless under the German domination.

The Netherlands Union soon came into conflict with the Dutch National Socialists. Differences between the two groups, at first limited to editorial exchanges, shortly grew into overt violence and street fighting. The demands of the National Socialists led the occupation authorities to apply repressive

measures, mild at first, but increasing in rigor as the conflict between Nazis and Union became more serious. In June 1941 the Netherlands Union refused to declare itself in support of the German attack on Russia, whereupon Seyss-Inquart ordered its dissolution and the confinement in Germany of its three leaders.

C. Party Dissolutions

The old, established political parties shared the fate of the Union. On 5 July 1941, at the beginning of the German campaign in Russia, the Catholic, Social Democratic, Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, Liberal Democratic, Liberal State, Reformed, and Christian Democratic parties were officially dissolved, and their leaders removed to concentration camps.

D. Role of the Dutch Nationalist Socialist Movement Under the Occupation

Members of the Dutch National Socialist Movement actively assisted the Germans in their conquest of the Netherlands. During the early months of the occupation, however, the Germans showed no inclination to lean heavily on Dutch Nazi support. The announced "soft policy," it apparently was thought in Berlin, could not operate effectively in cooperation with a renegade party repudiated by its own nation. But when the organization of opposition made it clear that the Dutch people had no intention of collaborating voluntarily, the Germans began to elevate NSB members to administrative posts. The replacement by Dutch Nazis of several Secretaries-General and Provincial Commissioners was the first step in the creation of a regime under which membership in the NSB became a definite requirement for appointment to

public office. NSB members have also taken important positions in the various institutions and "Fronts" established to control all phases of Dutch economy and culture under the fascist concept of the corporative state.

In December 1942 the Germans bestowed upon the party the title "Bearer of the Political Will of the Dutch People" and designated its chief, Mussert, "Leader of the Dutch People." In spite of these conspicuous honors, Mussert's cabinet, set up in February 1943, nevertheless failed to receive any status other than one of offering advice to the German authorities. While consulting Mussert's "shadow government" on matters of personnel and administration, the Reich Commissioner kept full authority, both actual and theoretical, in German hands. (See Chart V for the composition of the Mussert shadow government.)

The NSB has been torn by internal rivalries, partly because after the invasion it absorbed all the smaller pro-German parties in the Netherlands. Although the leaders of these groups have been given important posts in the party, several of them have continued to intrigue against Mussert, a development not discouraged by the Germans. M.M Rost van Tonningen, Secretary-General of Finance, President of the Netherlands Bank, and President of the Netherland East Company, is Mussert's chief rival. Another would-be successor to Mussert is J.J. Feldmeyer, leader of the Germanic SS and an exponent of German annexation of the Netherlands. Still a third is van Rappard, who formerly led the National Socialist Netherlands Workers' Party.

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Chart V. THE MUSSERT "SHADOW GOVERNMENT"
August 1944

Delegates for Affairs of State

Internal Affairs and National Security: C. van Geelkerken, Deputy-leader of the NSB

Education: Dr. J. Jeswiet. (acting)

Special Economic Matters and the Dutch East Company: H.H. Rost van Tonningen, Secretary. General for Finance, President of the Netherlands Bank.

Public Enlightenment: Dr. A.M.N. de Ranitz

Waterworks and Transportation: W. C. Z. van der Vegte, Director-General of Postal Services

Public Health: Dr. K. Keyer, Leader of the Medical Front

Agriculture and Fisheries: Major P. F. Tammens, mayor of Groningen, Supervisor of the Landstand

Social Affairs: C. van Ravenzwaay, Mayor of Utrecht

Special Duties, Special Institutions: H. W. Mulder Lohning

Delegates for People's Affairs

Radio:	Dr. W. A. Herweyer
Labor Service:	H. Mouldijk
People's Service:	F. W. van Vloten
Libraries:	F. H. M. Ouwerling
Museums:	Dr. D. Hannema

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The continued victories of the Allies have weakened the morale of NSB members, and the party has suffered from numerous defections on the part of opportunists now hurriedly dismounting from the German band-wagon. This defeatism, which extends in some instances to the highest Dutch Nazi leaders, resulted in the creation within the NSB of an internal security section, called the "Special Service" (Speciale Dienst), to investigate the actions and political opinions of party members. When this section proved inadequate to meet the situation, a more elaborate control system, the "General Supervision of Members" (Algemeen Toezicht Leden), was established to detect weak spots in the party membership.

Appendix I furnishes a brief outline of the organization of the Dutch National Socialist Movement, together with its paramilitary formations.

VI. PROBLEMS OF RESTORATION

A. The Return of the Dutch Government

The Netherlands Government-in-exile has prepared plans for a military government (Militair Gezag), to be instituted in Holland following the expulsion of the Germans. Whether this Militair Gezag is to remain under the jurisdiction of the War Department, as is now the case, or under the Department of Interior is a matter of debate in official Dutch circles. Regardless of the specific arrangements settled upon in this matter, however, Dutch observers in London and elsewhere expect that once the period of military administration is ended, the civil government will again be re-established in The Hague. The most urgent political problems confronting Dutch leaders will probably be those of restoring the parliamentary basis of the government and of reorganizing the cabinet. During the war there has been a growing disparity between the strength of the various parties, on the one hand, and, on the other, their respective representation in the ministry. The potential danger of permitting this situation to exist for long after expulsion of the Germans has been recognized by the Government-in-exile, as witness the public promise made by Gerbrandy that the entire cabinet will resign following the liberation. Whether the old Parliament should

be reconvened or a new one elected and how soon after returning the present ministers should offer their resignations are matters still being debated in Dutch circles: but present evidence indicates that in any case resistance groups within Holland favor an early dissolution of the Gerbrandy ministry as now constituted. This undoubtedly reflects the widespread feeling that the government in London has lost touch with the home population.

The Queen will probably authorize an attempt to draw up a ministry based on a broad coalition of pre-war parties. Resistance groups have expressed their eagerness to have general elections called at the earliest possible date for the purpose of determining the current strength of the various parties.

B. Prospects for NSB and Other Collaborationists

During more than four years of German occupation, pro-Nazis have moved into almost all high administrative posts in the Netherlands. Of the present Secretaries-General, for example, there is only one pre-1940 appointee; and he is a "technician" without political influence. Eight of the eleven Provincial Commissioners have been replaced since the German invasion; and each of the eleven must work with and satisfy a German Associate Commissioner. There are numerous other Dutch political figures, in office and out, who have

preached the creed of collaboration with the Reich. Along with the restoration of constitutional processes, the treatment of NSB members and other collaborationists will obviously be a major problem confronting a liberated Holland.

Some Dutch pro-Nazis will doubtless attempt to escape to Germany. Others will go underground. And still others may seek to excuse their records by insisting that they never really endorsed the principles of the NSB and adopted a collaborationist course only under duress. Some effort may even be made to achieve a continuance of some sort of neo-Fascism under changed party trappings. Popular hatred toward Dutch Nazis is so intense, however, that once German protection for the NSB has been removed, a wave of vengeance is likely to result. Whether a purge takes the form of mass violence or whether it abides by the more orderly processes of law, as favored by Dutch leaders abroad, it can be expected to end only when the populace is satisfied that retribution has been complete and that the National Socialist Movement of the Netherlands has been eradicated.

C. The Future of Other Dutch Parties

As has been pointed out, the underground resistance to German rule has not, with the exception of Communists and Socialists, been organized on the basis of pre-war parties.

The underground has developed numerous young leaders who express no allegiance to any political party. Some resistance groups have made a point of indicating their lack of interest in the traditional religious party alignments. Liberation promises to bring these new leaders into the open and with them a strong demand for profound alterations in the party politics of the Netherlands.

The future of Dutch politics is discussed in a document published in mid-1943 and circulated by the underground. It is written by five men, representatives of the following political parties: Anti-Revolutionary, Christian Historical, Catholic, Social Democratic, and Communist. The exclusion of the Liberal Parties from participation is explained by the belief expressed in the manifesto that Liberals will be absorbed in the other parties, both Right and Left. The conclusion reached by these writers is significant: "Cooperation between parties will (in the future) no longer be determined by views as to the meaning of life and the world, but by agreement on social and economic concepts." This attitude strikes at the heart of the former Catholic-Protestant coalition, and would support a realignment of parties based on non-religious differences. Such a fundamental change would work a basic change in the entire substance of Dutch party politics.

Appendix I. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS

A. Party Organization

1. Functional. Anton Mussert, whose headquarters is at Hilversum, is leader of the party. The deputy leader is C. van Geelkerken and the secretary of the party, C. J. Ha Huyghens. The central organization of the NSB includes seventeen functional sections, corresponding roughly to the departments in the pre-1940 Dutch Government, e.g., Finance, General Affairs, Public Health, Education, etc.

Of these, the Press and Propaganda Section is especially active. It publishes Het Nationale Dagblad (The National Daily) and the original organ of the party, the weekly Volk en Vaderland (People and Fatherland).

2. Territorial. The NSB is organized geographically on the basis of sixteen districts. Under the districts there are seventy-six areas (kringen), which are in turn subdivided into a total of nine hundred basic groups. The sixteen districts consist of Holland's eleven provinces plus five new divisions: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, the "Germany District," and the "Belgium District." Each "District Leader" has as his most important assistants the "Training Leader" and the "Propaganda Leader." It is worth noting that the

number of basic groups of the party: nine hundred, corresponds roughly to the number of municipalities in the country.

B. Subsidiary Organizations

1. National Youth Storm Formation (Nationale Jeugdstorm -- NJS). The NJS is charged with the political education of young Netherlanders. It is now the only youth organization in the country, all other youth groups having been dissolved and their property transferred to the NJS or to the National Youth Hostel Association.

2. National Socialist Women's Organization (National Socialistische Vrouwen Organizatie -- NSVO). The NSVO is the women's auxiliary of the NSB. It sponsors a program of social service and education.

3. META. The META is an organization for girls between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six. It is subordinate to the NSVO, and like the NSVO features a social-service program for girls.

C. Paramilitary Organizations

1. Defense Section of the NSB (Weer Afdeeling -- WA). In 1942 the strength of the WA was reported by its leader, J. A. Zondervan, to be twenty-five thousand of the most fanatical NSB members. Since that time the Defense Section has doubtless declined in size, since a large number of its men have lost their lives on the Russian front. The WA has

also been to some extent dispersed among other para-military formations.

2. Germanic SS in the Netherlands (Der Germaansche SS in Nederland). The Germanic SS in the Netherlands, led by J. H. Feldmeyer, is the most important para-military unit in Holland, and possesses a political influence which goes far beyond its military strength. Its members who are all ardent pro-Germans, take an oath of allegiance to Hitler rather than to any Dutch Nazi. From its headquarters at Utrecht the SS command controls not only its four divisions or "standards" (a fifth, the "West-land Standard" was destroyed in Russia) but also several other Dutch para-military units, such as the Landstorm.

3. Country Storm Guard (Landstorm). The Country Storm Guard was established in March 1943, and placed under the supervision of the Germanic SS. Its function was first declared to be the defense of Dutch territory, but pressure has been applied recently to induce Landstorm members to volunteer for service in German forces in other parts of Europe. Its size was estimated in November 1943 at approximately four thousand men.

4. Country Guard (Landwacht). The Landwacht was established on 17 October 1943 to protect NSB leaders, but has since assumed duties amounting to those of an auxiliary police

force. It is under the joint supervision of the NSB, the WA, and the Germanic SS. Only part of the Landwacht members are on permanent active duty, the rest forming an emergency reserve.